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MERCOSUR: LESSONS FROM THE
RECENT PAST- THE CASE OF
THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
Eva Holz*
I. MERCOSUR: ITS RELEVANCE & GENERAL OVERVIEW
A. INTEGRATION AND LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE
HE Asuncion Treaty and the subsequent Protocols adopt and gen-
erate pragmatic structures and mechanisms. They center around
the regulation of instruments for the progressive reduction and
eventual elimination of tariff barriers, and the annulment of any non-
tariff barriers that exist in the signatory countries.1 The treaty, however,
is innovative when compared to previous integration schemes because it
establishes a process of linear, gradual, and automatic reductions of tar-
iffs, while at the same time it setting goals to establish a common external
tariff and coordinate macroeconomic policies. In terms of the treaty's
institutions and bodies, pragmatism is evident in the transitory, flexible,
and simple nature of the structures it creates to allow for more fluid adap-
tation to existing regimes in each of the signatory countries. 2
As a result of previous Latin American integrationist experiences with
varying degress of success, the Party States of the Mercado Comtin del
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Uruguayan law in the areas of securitisation, trusts, investments, factoring, and
corporate law. In 1998, she took office as advisor to the Minister of Economy,
under contract with the United Nations Program for harmonising regulation to-
wards MERCOSUR integration. Dr. Holz was awarded a grant by the Fulbright
Foundation to conduct research on the subject of "integration of the banking sys-
tem" in the Universities of Arizona, Golden Gate, and Harvard Law School. Her
work resulted in publication of a book on the above topic entitled La Integracion
de los Sistemas Bancarios. She has given courses and seminars on the securities
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1. Treaty of Asunci6n, Mar. 26, 1991, 30 I.L.M. 1041. The Asunci6n Treaty was
signed by Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, and Paraguay, and went into effect on No-
vember 29, 1991-the same day it was filed with ALADI as Partial Scope Eco-
nomic Complementation Agreement No. 18. This first agreement for the
formation of a common market was supplemented by a second document, the
Brasilia Protocol, signed December 17, 1991, and was followed by a third docu-
ment, the Ouro Preto Additional Protocol. Protocol of Ouro Preto, Dec. 17, 1994,
34 I.L.M. 1244 (1995) [hereinafter Ouro Preto].
2. EVA HOLZ, LA INTEGRACION DE LOS SISTEMAs BANCARIOS 20-25 (1997).
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Sur, or Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR), did not
attempt, at an initial stage, to enter more deeply into potentially conflic-
tive aspects or areas in terms of their structure or harmonization. This is
a logical attitude given that, in any case, the most urgent steps relate to
trade areas, the facilitation for the circulation of goods between coun-
tries, and the reduction and elimination of trade barriers.
The road to trade liberalization has been paved with foreseen difficul-
ties. It takes a long time, even among developed countries, to achieve
some degree of economic convergence and simultaneously keep the path
to the liberalization of trade and services. Therefore, it has not been sur-
prising that the goal set forth in the Asuncion Treaty to create a Common
Market on December 31, 1994, a date that was clearly too ambitious, has
been postponed formally and informally two times. During the meeting
of the Consejo Mercado Comin (CMC) (Spanish, Common Market
Council), the highest MERCOSUR decision making body, held August 4-
5, 1994, it was acknowledged that the original goal would not be met.
Accordingly, it was agreed to start a new convergence period, beginning
January 1, 1995. Such agreement was reflected in a number of decisions
made by the CMC (Decision Numbers 3/94, 5/94, 6/94, 7/94, 8/94, 9/94,
and 10/94), and later in decisions made at the Ouro Preto CMC meeting
of December 17, 1994. The CMC established a new schedule under
which the Free Trade Area, not fully completed to date, would come into
full force as of January 1, 2000, and the Customs Union as of January 1,
2006.3
Because of the Brazilian crisis and its impact on the region, this sched-
ule was implicitly modified in 2000 and 2001 with the adoption of certain
decisions of the MERCOSUR Re-launching CMC. These decisions cov-
ered a range of areas such as market access; improvement of the dispute
settlement system; and analysis of the structure of bodies depending on
the Common Market Group (or Grupo Mercado Comtin (GMC),
MERCOSUR's highest executive body), the Trade Committee, or the
Common External Tariff (Numbers 22/00, 25/00, 26/00, 27/00 respec-
tively), whose objectives were to analyze and solve difficulties related to
the operation of MERCOSUR encountered in their respective areas of
competence. Later, CMC Decision Number 7/01 postponed to 2001 the
terms that previous decisions related to the MERCOSUR Re-launching
had set for the year 2000. Note that such decisions of the MERCOSUR
Re-launching Council imply a relatively positive response in view of the
3. CMC Decisions 3/94, 5/94, 6/94, 7/94, 8/94, 9/94, and 10/94. On December 17, 1994,
the CMC meeting in Ouro Preto adopted the following: (1) CMC Decision 22/94,
which created the Common External Tariff, lists of exceptions to the CET, and
lists of convergence for the capital goods, computer technology, and telecommuni-
cations sectors; (2) CMC Decision 23/94 on the Origin Regimen for products not
included in the CET or with specific requirements, which are all subject to the
Original Regime set forth in CMC Decision 6/94; (3) CMC Decision 24/94 on the
Regime for Final Adjustment to the Customs Union; and (4) CMC Decision 25/94
approving the Customs Code-the basic regulation for MERCOSUR customs
territory.
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critical situation facing Member countries since 1999, that brought forth
serious difficulties in the implementation of the MERCOSUR
Agreement.4
B. MERCOSUR's NEGOTIATING CAPACITY IN TRADE AGREEMENTS
Regardless of the ups and downs in the economic integration process of
MERCOSUR, the four Party States have undoubtedly formed a coherent
group, especially in terms of consideration and negotiation with interloc-
utors or economic agreements at international fora. It is interesting that
in the different processes of economic and political analysis, regional cir-
cumstances are identified with those of MERCOSUR. In this sense, the
expression is used as an equivalent of the Southern Cone area of South
America. In addition, the fact that countries signing the Asuncion Treaty
have sometimes joined efforts when making proposals to international
interlocutors has led to the perception of MERCOSUR as an economic
and political unit and, hence, the two-fold effect of generating internal
cohesion and a common front before the different external interlocutors.
Concrete institutional expressions of this nature and of joint interna-
tional negotiation policies are already suggested in Decision Number 32/
00 of the CMC vis-bi-vis MERCOSUR Foreign Relations, which reaffirms
the commitment of Party States to negotiate trade agreements jointly
with third party countries or groups of countries outside the area, at least
wherever tariff preferences are agreed. Later, this trend was defined rel-
ative to Negotiations with Third Party Countries in Decision Number 08/
01 of the same body, which resolved to accelerate the bilateral negotia-
tion processes of which MERCOSUR is a part, in particular the ongoing
negotiations with the European Union (EU). The latter also includes a
mandate to the Pro Tempore Presidency of MERCOSUR to convene the
Consultative Council, following the agreement signed by the
MERCOSUR Party States and the Government of the United States, in
order to study the possibility of initiating bilateral negotiations under a
four-plus-one format. To this effect, a Negotiation Group has been or-
ganized with the priority of defining a common negotiation platform. Dr.
Enrique Iglesias, the president of Inter-American Development Bank
(1DB), has been invited to act as Senior Advisor of the Negotiation
Group. 5
One aspect of great relevance for the continuity and success of this new
role of MERCOSUR lies in each of its Party States' policies, particularly
those of Brazil and, to some extent, Argentina, toward MERCOSUR and
the region. This refers to the importance they will attribute to
MERCOSUR's best interests as a whole, especially where those interests
may clash with others in the national sphere.
4. Id.
5. CMC Decision 32/00 (June 30, 2000), available at http://www.scc.oas.org/trade/
mrcsrs/decisions/Dec3200.asp (quoting CMC Decision 08/01 (June 22, 2001)).
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At this stage, the fact that MERCOSUR is negotiating necessarily as a
block with the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the United
States, and the EU, will constitute an element of alignment and consis-
tency necessary for the regional agreement. The joint policy of such ne-
gotiations, with developed countries as counterparts, will make it an
imposition and an obligation to preserve consistent parameters that ad-
just to policies and macroeconomic coordination and, in addition, are
consistent in setting tariffs as a prerequisite to successful progress.
C. FINANCIAL GLOBALIZATION AND
MACROECONOMIC STRENGTHENING
In light of the successive Asian, Russian, and Brazilian crises, followed
by the Turkish and recent Argentine crises, it becomes imperative to
question whether the benefits of globalization and financial integration
justify the absorption of their costs and risks. Liberalizing the circulation
of goods, services, and capital generates trade growth, resulting in prod-
uct growth. Additionally, resources and capital become more efficiently
located and used, contributing to the well-being and improved standards
of living of many societies subject to the integration framework. Regard-
ing financial globalization, many countries in Asia and Latin America
have had the opportunity to modernize their industries and economies, at
least in part, due to their free access to available external savings, regard-
less of the need to recognize the advisability of protecting their depen-
dency on very short-term capitals. On the other hand, the growing
perception of risks-relative to crises or to a higher probability of a crisis
extension-and the resulting costs to societies in terms of the loss in well-
being for the population, requires a profound study in order to avoid, or
at least mitigate, them.
Precisely, the increasing possibility of "contagion" due to financial
globalization should not lead us to lose sight of factors inherent to each
country that represent the underlying causes of their fragile nature in re-
sisting external blows. This leads inexorably to the need for
macroeconomic strengthening of each of the countries themselves, be-
yond integration processes, as a true way to mitigate individually the im-
pacts of financial globalization. Furthermore, globalization may
contribute to deepen crises due to the persistent application of im-
balanced macroeconomic policies. Under such circumstances, the inves-
tors' loss of confidence in the maintenance of policies in a given country
could act as a a trigger to spark the crisis, therefore causing them to with-
draw their investments and close access to international credit.
What the Asian, Russian and Brazilian crises have had in common, de-
spite each responding to partially different reasons, is that they were gen-
erated and aggravated by persistent macroeconomic inconsistencies,
resulting from the persistence of unsustainable structural deficits and sig-
nificant external debt (mostly too short-termed) or any other similar defi-
cit-financing mechanisms, without substantial corrections of the reasons
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generating them. It is essential that macroeconomic policies of countries
lead to sustainable values in terms of deficit, debt, and product growth.
II. FINANCIAL LIBERALIZATION: REFLECTIONS
A. MACROECONOMIC COORDINATION IN REGIONAL INTEGRATION
1. Macroeconomic Situation in the MERCOSUR Countries:
1999 - 2002
Implementation of MERCOSUR gave rise to a rapid and extensive in-
crease of trade flows among the member countries. For example, Argen-
tine exports to Brazil rose from $1.67 billion to $7.7 billion U.S. dollars in
1997.6
Brazil, with a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of approximately $500
billion dollars, has a significant influence on MERCOSUR trade. For ex-
ample, Argentina represents approximately 40 percent of Brazilian pro-
duction, whereas Uruguay and Paraguay's combined production does not
amount to even 5 percent of Brazil's production. Brazil's substantial pro-
duction helps explain why Brazilian macroeconomic stability is so rele-
vant in the region.7 Brazilian production also has repercussions on the
level of regional trade, which notoriously increases during periods of sta-
bility-a result that has been seen since the implantation of the Real
plan. It is clear, however, that growth of trade in the region has resulted
from a relatively higher level of prices in Brazil as compared to its trade
partners, and by a preferential rate of customs duties among them. Thus,
the increase of trade in the region, at least in part, took place at the ex-
pense of an increase in the Brazilian trade balance. For example, in 1993,
the Brazilian trade surplus reached $13.3 billion dollars, while in 1998 the
trade deficit was over $6 billion dollars. Over this same period, Uru-
guayan and Argentine exports to Brazil increased by 150 percent and 188
percent respectively (even considering goods that are hard to place on
other markets and that are exported under MERCOSUR special
regimes).8
As a result of the economic climate in Brazil, the exchange rate exper-
ienced sustained pressure from mid-1998, when the Russian crisis broke
out.9 This pressure caused a significant loss of reserves, which, coupled
6. Eva Holz, The Impact of Financial Crises on Regional Integration Processes: The
Case of the Crisis in the Brazilian Economy (1999-2000) and MERCOSUR I (Mar.
27, 1999) (paper for the Sixth Annual Conference of the International Law Review
Association of Southern Methodist University) [hereinafter Holz Dallas]; Eva
Holz, The Impact Of Financial Crises On Regional Integration Processes: The Case
Of The Crisis In The Brazilian Economy (1999-2000) and MERCOSUR 1-2 (June
2000) (paper for the London University Conference) [hereinafter Holz London];
Eva Holz, Banking in MERCOSUR: Liberalisation and Integration, Policy Reflec-
tions 130-31 (2003) (unpublished) [hereinafter Banking in MERCOSUR].
7. See sources cited supra note 6.
8. Id.; see Treaty of Asunci6n, supra note 1, at 1041; Montevideo Protocol, signed
Dec. 15, 1997.
9. See Holz Dallas, supra note 6, at 2; Holz London, supra note 6, 1-2; Banking in
MERCOSUR, supra note 6, at 130-31.
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with the increasing fiscal deficit of the government and political factors, 10
caused the Central Bank of Brazil to withdraw from the exchange mar-
ket on January 15, 1999. Devaluation of the Real finally became stable at
approximately 50 percent of its value, although it showed an upward
trend during the last months of 2000 and throughout 2001.11 Together
with exchange measures, the Brazilian government adopted various sub-
stantive measures to reduce the fiscal deficit, making it possible for the
economic and financial variables to become stable during the year 2000.12
Thus, during the year 2000, industrial activities in Brazil grew approxi-
mately 7 percent, exports grew 17 percent, and imports grew 14.6 percent.
Inflation was almost 6 percent. 13 Over the years 2001 and 2002, the econ-
omy stabilized and grew slightly, inflation was kept under control, and the
Real oscillated between 3 and 3.5 Reals per U.S. dollar (mostly due to
political uncertainty prior to Brazilian elections at the end of 2002).
a. Repercussions
The Brazilian crisis eliminated overvaluation of the Real, which in-
volved, among other things, the modification of trade flow within the
MERCOSUR due to a drop in exports to Brazil, and an increase in Bra-
zilian exports to other member countries of the Agreement. 14 Taken to-
gether, these elements lessened demand for goods and services in the
countries of the region, leading to a drop in production. The prices of the
various goods and services also dropped, resulting in a recessive effect.
Production fell in all countries in the region, especially in Argentina and
Uruguay, which experienced drops of 3.5 percent in GDP. Unemploy-
ment rose substantially, reaching 14.5 percent in Argentina, 6.3 percent in
Brazil, 11.2 percent in Uruguay, 9.0 percent in Paraguay, and 10 percent
in Chile. And, finally, inflation rates in these countries also dropped. 15
The significant variation in the economic situation of the various
MERCOSUR member countries, together with the correction of many
prices of goods and services traded intra-regionally, had ongoing reper-
cussions on the evolution of integration. However, the final results will
depend significantly on the type of mechanisms used to mitigate the im-
pact of such price changes.
b. The Impact on Argentina and its Consequences on Uruguay
The recessive adjustment of 1999 led to a drop in the price of tradable
goods. During the first half of 2000, an improvement in the merchandise
account was observed, resulting in a surplus. Unfortunately, recession




14. See Holz Dallas, supra note 6, at 4; Holz London, supra note 6, at 1-2; Banking in
MERCOSUR, supra note 6, at 131.
15. Id.
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continued during 2000.16 Since the implementation of the convertibility
plan in 1989, the exchange rate in Argentina was fixed, parity being es-
tablished at one peso per U.S. dollar.' 7 During 2000, unemployment
rates continued to be close to 15 percent. Although exports showed an
upwards trend, the GDP dropped slightly, public income continued to
fall, and, despite successive attempts to contain public expenditure and
increase collecting, the deficit in public accounts continued to rise. 18 At
the end of the year, this led the government to request financial assis-
tance, or shielding, from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the
amount of $39,700,000 U.S. dollars, announced at the beginning of 2001.19
During 2001, the situation was further complicated by the closure of for-
eign capital markets and the deterioration of fiscal accounts.20
In March 2001, the Minister of Economy changed three times.21 The
most recent Minister, Cavallo, promoted a plan to make the country's
economy competitive again, calling for more spending cuts. Some of the
measures adopted included taxes on bank transactions, unilateral modifi-
cation of MERCOSUR customs duties, sectoral reactivation plans with
special tax treatment for sectors considered to be strategic, and the crea-
tion of a trade dollar, which involved a change in the convertibility ex-
change system. Cavallo also adopted measures to improve the external
debt profile. Simultaneously, in order to obtain domestic credit, he re-
duced the reserves of financial institutions and modified their composi-
tion, admitting National Government obligations for the purpose of
constituting the reserve.22 In this way, the strength of the financial sys-
tem was undermined, increasing its exposure to government risk. Half-
way through the year when the bid for domestic obligations failed,
Cavallo admitted that he did not have domestic credit and introduced a
budgetary ruling of zero deficit, also applicable to the provinces which
were temporarily authorized to finance their excess expenditure by issu-
ing obligations with cancelling power (quasi-currencies, like the LECOP
and the Patacones). 23 The debt in the government's paying capacity and
the 1989 Bonex Plan led to a persistent drain on the system's deposits.
Consequently, recession worsened as investments dropped over 20 per-
cent, lessening domestic consumption, and consequently reducing GDP.2 4
Finally, the economy collapsed in December 2001, and new economic
and financial rules were issued by the government (such as Law 25.561,
dated January 7, 2002), which were focused on employment, reasonable
income for the population, and reducing indebtedness in the financial sys-








24. Banking in MERCOSUR, supra note 6, at 132-33.
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tern.2 5 At the same time, however, those new rules meant the collapse of
the paying system and the credit chain, and the end of confidence in Ar-
gentina's financial system.2 6 Moreover, the new rules destroyed Argen-
tina's reputation in the international credit and financial markets.27 For
example, on December 24, 2001, the Argentine government defaulted on
its debt of $141 billion U.S. dollars. As a result, the convertibility cur-
rency rule was changed (one peso to every $ 1 U.S. dollar), but suddenly,
in January 2002, the peso was only worth one third of a U.S. dollar. Con-
sequently, nearly all deposits were frozen-meaning that depositors
could not withdraw their savings from the banking system (corralito). In
addition, banks had to accept that many debts named in U.S. dollars or
other strong currencies could be cancelled by paying in the Argentine
devaluated currency (peso) at nominal parities (one peso equaling one
dollar when the peso at the time was worth one third of a U.S. dollar),
but depositors had to be maintained and finally paid back in the currency
of the original deposit or at a parity to be fixed by the executive power in
order to preserve the value of the saving, called pesificaci6n asimrntrica.28
This meant insolvency for all financial institutions.29 During 2002, it is
estimated that bank losses due to asset depreciation amounted to $20 bil-
Ion U.S. dollars. 30 As a result, some international banks, such as New
Scotia, quit their operations in Argentina.31 The subsequent economic
measures applied by the new government during 2002 and the first part of
2003 were unsuccessful, especially the attempted rebuilding of the finan-
cial system. 32 The IMF and other international financial organizations
criticized the inconsistency of the government's economic measures. To-
day, the public debt is still in default. 33 Since July 2002, the economy has
begun its recovery, but still without the assistance of a local operating
banking system. There is no domestic or international credit, and inter-
national trade is mostly financed by other international financial
institutions.34
The collapse of Argentina's financial system first had an impact in Jan-
uary 2002, on banks operating in Argentina and Uruguay when the re-
strictions imposed on operations in Argentina forced Argentine bank
clients to withdraw their deposits from the Uruguayan branches of the
same institutions.35 This was soon followed by a general run of most Ar-
gentine depositors and international banks from all Uruguayan financial













event similar measures as those imposed in Argentina should be adopted
by the Uruguayan government. 36 As the crisis in Argentina continued in
2002, its negative impact on the Uruguayan economy increased over the
same period, causing continuation of the depositors' run from Uruguayan
banks. In the context of currency exchange, in June 2002, Uruguay aban-
doned its crawling peg system, allowing the Uruguayan peso to float.37 A
month later, in July, a bank holiday was declared, four private banks were
suspended (not liquidated, but closed), and deposits on two seriously il-
liquid state-owned banks where extended for two years, to be paid in the
currency in which the deposit was established. 38 Rules for solvent banks
(international banks) were not changed. There was no general freezing
of deposits or any change in the currency of deposits. 39 From January to
July 2002, Uruguay's financial system lost over 40 percent of its
deposits. 40
Finally, on December 27, 2002, Law Number 17.613 was passed, estab-
lishing a new procedure for the liquidation of the four suspended banks
and broadening Banco Central del Uruguay (BCU) (Spanish, Uruguayan
Central Bank) regulatory and controlling powers over private and public
financial institutions, as well as on private bank shareholders, directors,
and managers. 41 On the other hand, public debt was not in default, and
in May 2003 a voluntary extension was agreed upon by international and
local Uruguayan debt holders.42
2. The Need for Macroeconomic Coordination
The need for consistent macroeconomic policies is increased within a
regional integration process. In fact, a comparison of various experiences
and MERCOSUR itself reveals that macroeconomic coordination repre-
sents an unavoidable foundation upon which consolidation of integration
agreements must rest. In the case of the MERCOSUR region, the situa-
tion over the last few years reveals once again that the lack of close coor-
dination among the governments of the Parties in the definition and
implementation of the macroeconomic variables underlies all the difficul-
ties that have been threatening the continuity of MERCOSUR since
2000.
4 3
Relevant monetary, currency, and inflation policies, and the situation
and evolution of the balance of payments and the balance of trade are
some of the aspects affecting each of the countries simultaneously. For








43. See the foregoing trade desadjustments and the beginning of Argentinean and
Uruguayan crises at Part II.A.L.a & b.
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itial definition to the necessary and permanent follow-up process to mon-
itor their evolution on a daily basis-require coordinated thought on the
part of all governments in the countries undergoing integration processes.
The more progress is observed in the liberalization of the flow of trade
and services due to the implementation of the integration agreement, the
greater are the repercussions on the rest of the Party States of mal-adjust-
ments on the main economic variables in any of the member countries.
One example of this can be seen-even in the early stages of the opening-
up process in MERCOSUR-by observing the adjustments that the radi-
cal change in the Brazilian foreign exchange criteria gave rise to and will
still require, and that led to an unforeseeable and unaligned fluctuation in
the relative prices of goods and services at the level of the other
MERCOSUR partners. 44
An essential step toward the improvement of coordination will be to
intensify the flow and quality of information that countries exchange, rel-
ative to public and private sectors. In addition, information transparency
must be enhanced, including, for example, information regarding interna-
tional reserves, foreign debt-especially short-term foreign debt-and
capital flows from each of the countries. This information, with its fol-
low-up, will enable a more precise assessment of the situation and risks
facing each of these countries and the region. Enhanced quality informa-
tion will influence the adoption of more accurate and appropriate eco-
nomic measures by facilitating analysis and discussion from the other
partner countries.
B. POLITICAL COMMITMENTS IN THE IMPLEMENTATION OF
COORDINATED MACROECONOMIC POLICIES
Preventing distortions in the macroeconomic policies of the region re-
quires both an intensification of coordination among countries, and a
high level of reciprocal and political commitment. Each government is
responsible not only for the sound development of the variables in its
own country, but also for ensuring that its own policies are not obstacles
to the development of economies in the other member countries of the
integration agreement. From the outset of MERCOSUR, this commit-
ment was taken up by the four Party States in an implicit and consensual
manner, with the understanding that none of the signatory parties of the
Asuncion Treaty would fail to comply.4S
However, since 1999, shortcomings of this commitment have been evi-
denced, as the commitment has not been complied with on more than one
occasion. Thus, the new integration stages within the scope of
MERCOSUR will call for more formal and intense mechanisms to keep
macroeconomic coordination commitments among the countries. Any
44. !d.
45. The Top Level Working Group was created between 2000 and 2001. Before that,
there were no institutional mechanisms or procedures regarding macroeconomic
issues.
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breach in coordination rules should involve pertinent and detrimental
consequences for the offender.
The initial steps in that direction are first suggested in Decision Num-
ber 6/99 of the CMC, which calls for the creation of a Top Level Working
Group in the sphere of the Meeting of Ministers of Economy and Presi-
dents of Central Banks, with the objective of coordinating
macroeconomic policies in the Member States.46 The fields covered are
inter-temporal sustainability of the countries' public and external ac-
counts, the alternatives for macroeconomic coordination and a working
program proposal to that end, the harmonization of statistical
macroeconomic and financial information, and the intensification of in-
formation relative to methodological criteria used by each State to pre-
pare its respective economic indicators. Likewise, Decision Number 30/
00 of the CMC47 entrusts Ministers of Economy and Presidents of Cen-
tral Banks with the preparation of a harmonized statistic based on a com-
mon methodology in the macroeconomic and financial services areas.
Harmonization will start with the information included in the Nominal
Fiscal Results and Primary Fiscal Government Result, the Governmental
Net Debt, the Consolidated Public Sector, and the level of prices. Indica-
tors relative to fiscal aspects must be published from September 2000.
Harmonized statistics were first published on October 21, 2001.
This process must be expedited and further developed for the sake of
regional economic well-being, as well as for MERCOSUR integration
perspectives. 48  Clear commitments must be made regarding
macroeconomic variables and their convergence. Non-compliance with
those commitments may cause diplomatic and/or economic penalties to
the offender-penalties that should be established according to severity.
C. CLEAR POLICIES IN BANK INTEGRATION
To date, MERCOSUR and its Party States have not addressed finan-
cial liberalization in depth. Apart from preparing lists of offers and com-
mitments for service liberalization, it is remarkable that, despite
subscription to the Montevideo Protocol, no progress has been made in
the incorporation of financial services to such lists. 49 Moreover, restric-
tions and limitations to liberalization, expressed by the countries when
the initial list of commitments was prepared in the framework of the
46. CMC Decision 6/99 (June 15, 1999).
47. CMC Decision 30/00 (June 30, 2000).
48. No advances were achieved in 2002 or 2003. See Banking in MERCOSUR, supra
note 6, at 137-38, for details.
49. CMC Decision 13/97 (Dec. 15, 1997); Montevideo Protocol-Financial Service and
Initial List of Specific Commitments Annex, CMC Decision 9/98 (July 23-24,
1998). This initial list was revised at the First and Second Round of Negotiations
on Specific Commitments that were formally finalized, the first by CMC Decision
1/00 (June 29, 2000), and the second by CMC Decision 56/00 (Dec. 14, 2000). Both
decisions approved the countries' lists of specific commitments. CMC Decision 36/
00 (June 29, 2000).
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Montevideo Protocol, have not been altered.50 Recall that the first list
simply gathered the commitments that each country had previously
presented as a list to the World Trade Organization (WTO), with no addi-
tional considerations, even in cases where it was feasible without having
to introduce changes at the level of national legislation.5' Note that since
2001, the work of the Services Group includes the detection and incorpo-
ration of the country's commitments to the lists, non-restricted areas in
terms of internal regulations, and, despite this, not included in the specific
commitments. Furthermore, such lists of offers and commitments were
created and presented under those conditions, despite the fact that the
information relative to the existing spaces for greater openings and liber-
alizations was then available as a result of the work conducted by Sub-
group IV.52
The lack of political will to start with the necessary liberalization to
harmonize and integrate financial sectors was reaffirmed with Brazil's de-
cision, expressed at Sub-group IV and included in their Minutes 1/95 of
October 20, 1995, that postponed consideration of attempts to harmonize
any aspect related to derogation of restrictions to access and invest in the
financial sector by companies from a MERCOSUR country in any of the
other Party States until the year 2000.53 This situation clearly reflects the
lack of commitment to move forward in financial integration and to re-
duce, and finally eliminate, restrictions to competition that are still pre-
sent in some countries.
The opening up of the range of activities granted to bank institutions
and investing regimes, which took place in the MERCOSUR countries
during the 1990s, was not a consequence of the Agreement; instead, it
was due to national policies of some of the Party States following interna-
tional trends. 54 On the other hand, at the present time, as the whole re-
gion and its Party States are immersed in macroeconomic crises, it is
neither timely nor advisable to address a financial liberalization agenda.
The macroeconomic instability that conspires against commercial integra-
tion has a stronger negative impact in the case of financial integration due
to the possible systemic and contagious repercussions in the financial sys-
tems of each country. Only when the region reaches stability will it be
able to reconsider its agenda and aim at a financial opening and integra-
tion within MERCOSUR.
In due course, this process should undoubtedly be approached care-
fully in order to avoid excesses in deregulations with prudential implica-
50. See discussion and sources cited supra note 49.
51. Id.
52. CMC Decision 13/97 (Dec. 15, 1997); CMC Decision 9/98 (July 23-24, 1998); CMC
Decision 36/00 (June 30, 2000); WTO, complete text of the Final Agreement, Uru-
guay Round, and the GATS.
53. CMC Decision 9/95 (Dec. 6, 1995).
54. Eva Holz, International Agreements in Latin American Financial Services: Effects
on National Regulation and Perspectives 6 (Oct. 2000) (paper presented at a meet-
ing of the Latin American Trade Network (FLACSO)) [hereinafter Holz Latin
American].
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tions or with strong lack of protection of the weaker segments in the
financial systems of each country. These elements, according to evidence,
have neither been analyzed nor coordinated.
D. OPPORTUNITIES FOR LIBERALIZATION IN BANKING AcTIVITY
An analysis of the financial system regulations in the countries of
MERCOSUR reveals that there is plenty of room to liberalize such ser-
vices to increase competition. This declaration is especially valid in an
integration context, as many of the restrictions addressed have a particu-
lar impact on the supply of financial services that can be developed in any
MERCOSUR country, and on the foreign investment (from companies in
other Party States) in each one of them.
Over the last decade, Member countries have expanded the range of
activities granted to banking institutions and have admitted, in one way
or another, foreign investment in the sector, which is the consistent trend
in the rest of Latin America. 55 These changes have occurred while they
have imposed stricter prudential rules to the whole of their banking sys-
tem. As previously mentioned, the Agreement did not open up banking
regulation and the investing regime; it was part of the national policies of
some of the Party States following international trends.56 On the con-
trary, many aspects of the modifications and strengthening of prudential
rules imposed in each of the Party States were due to a coordinated pol-
icy decided at the MERCOSUR level. 57
Nevertheless, comparing these advances with the general international
trend, there is still ample room for expansion in the banking industry. In
addition, the levels of liberalization admitted by each one of the Party
States vary. This may have potential repercussions by creating uneven
conditions for competition in the sector. For example, in terms of bank-
ing activity, the MERCOSUR countries do not admit universal banks-
meaning that banking institutions cannot normally provide all the range
55. Id.
56. International organizations, like Bank of International Settlements (BIS), Interna-
tional Organization for Securities Commissioners (IOSCO), International Associa-
tion for Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), IMF, WB, IADB, and WTO, foster the
liberalization and opening up to foreign investment and competition in financial
sectors. Some of them, on the other hand, also promote the strengthening of the
prudential requisites (i.e. BIS, IMF, WB, and IADB).
57. All the MERCOSUR countries have adopted requirements for credit risk-
weighted capital of at least 10 percent of the assets. Another valuable example is
that, on the basis of the Subgroup's policy harmonization efforts concerning the
struggle against legitimization of assets from illegal activities, which is set out in
Recommendation No. 01/00 and was submitted to the GMC, this body adopted
CMC Resolution 53/00 regarding "Minimum Regulation Standards to be adopted
by Central Banks for the prevention and repression of money laundering." In
turn, this Resolution gave rise to CMC Decision 40/00 (Dec. 14-15, 2000) (adopt-
ing the "Cupertino Convention among Central Banks in the Party States to the
MERCOSUR, for the prevention and repression of procedures aiming at the legi-
timisation of assets from illegal activities"). In addition, GMC Resolution 20/01
stipulated that the Party States should adopt the information transparency rules
recommended by the Basle Committee before December 31, 2005.
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of financial services, operate as securities agents, or render any other ser-
vices related to the capital market. Furthermore, they cannot perform
activities related to insurance. 58 On the other hand, there is some oppor-
tunity to make the investment scheme of banking institutions both more
flexible, which enables them to invest in the capital market sector and in
non-financial institutions and, in turn, establish financial and insurance
clusters, and also more freely accepting of foreign investment in the
sector.59
Liberalization may possibly exist in other areas because there are no
regulatory obstacles preventing it. Unfortunately, countries neither offer
nor commit to greater openings in the framework of negotiations of the
Montevideo Protocol and the Financial Services Annex to allow for liber-
alization. This is apparent in the areas of trans-boundary supply, foreign
consumption of insurance, and banking services, where none of the coun-
tries have consolidated their offers. Another example is the horizontal
commitments of Brazil in insurance and banking services, relative to for-
eign investment or to the limitation in the employment of foreign staff,
that exceeds the existing constitutional and legal restrictions.60
The above observations do not call for countries to maximize the level
of opening that is possible in their financial services to achieve integra-
tion. However, they will duly require a common approach strategy to
cautiously attain liberalization stages that are in themselves balanced in
order to avoid competitive distortions among the integrated countries.
This harmonization is essential so that when the access of financial insti-
tutions to other MERCOSUR countries that are not the country of origin
becomes liberalized, the institutions' trend to establish themselves or to
provide financial services from one country and not from others-caused
by a difference in the schemes related to activities and investment al-
lowed in the banking sector-can be avoided.
For example, Paraguay is the only MERCOSUR country today that
fully allows universal banks.61 In full integration contexts where other
countries do not admit this broad activity to their financial systems, it is
likely that all banks in the region would settle in Paraguay to take advan-
tage of greater business opportunities that the universal activity grants.
In addition, from the Paraguayan subsidiary or branch, these banks could
offer greater services to their customers throughout the region. Likewise,
if Brazil maintains its present restrictive foreign investment scheme in the
banking sector, in an integration context, international and regional
banks would settle in any other MERCOSUR country to provide all
banking services to their Brazilian customers through that branch, and
they could then request to be acknowledged as an institution installed
58. Banking in MERCOSUR, supra note 6, at 102-12.
59. Id.; see Holz Latin American, supra note 54, at 6.
60. CMC Decision 13/97 (Dec. 15, 1997); CMC Decision 9/98 (July 23-24, 1998); CMC
Decision 36/00 (June 30, 2000).
61. Banking in MERCOSUR, supra note 6, at 108.
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within MERCOSUR to provide services to the Federative Republic of
Brazil.
To mitigate the impact of this expansion and increased competition, it
may be temporarily necessary for some of these governments to protect
key areas in banking services along this road to liberalization. For exam-
ple, it may be wise not to completely dismantle all the benefits or protec-
tions to sectors, such as the local banking sector, or to certain institutions
that have social objectives. These partial policies reduce the more poten-
tially negative impacts of integration and can be appropriate instruments
for the gradual opening of the markets.
The greater competition, resulting from the opening of markets and a
certain level of deregulation, may cause a trend toward banking concen-
tration and consolidation, at least in the short run, as part of the possible
strategies of the financial institutions to reduce the effects of the growing
presence of new competitors. In any case, facilitating market access that
adds to the general phenomenon of globalization and internationalization
can alleviate the trend toward concentration. On the other hand, consoli-
dation of the banking sector may constitute an institutional strengthening
factor-one necessary to preserve the solvency of the system in a more
competitive and deregulated environment.
E. LIBERALIZATION MECHANISMS
Another necessary aspect involves the instruments specifically used to
integrate MERCOSUR financial sectors, which clearly convey the influ-
ence and solutions of the General Agreement on Trade and Services
(GATS) agreement of the WTO. In light of the results attained, this
strategy has not met the expectations of its supporters.
The approach and concrete solutions to integrate services as set out in
the Montevideo Protocol are very similar to those of the GATS,62 with
the exception that the most-favored nation clause has no limitations in
the former agreement, but does in the latter. This analogy is again ob-
served in the Annex to Financial Services in the Montevideo Protocol,
which includes the solutions of Annex to Financial Services of the GATS.
Moreover, Decision Number 36/00 of the CMC adopts the GATS services
classification of the WTO to classify services within the scope of
MERCOSUR. In short, the instrument used by MERCOSUR to ap-
proach liberalization of trade in services has been that of a trade agree-
ment-the GATS-with the aim of creating a Free Trade Area. This
approach differs from the one used by the EU to create a Common
Market.
There are many reasons why the MERCOSUR Member countries
adopted this approach rather than favoring solutions similar to those
adopted by the EU.63 On one hand, this strategy can be attributed to the
62. CMC Decision 13/97 (Dec. 15, 1997); CMC Decision 9/98 (July 23-24, 1998); CMC
Decision 36/00 (June 30, 2000).
63. Banking in MERCOSUR, supra note 6, at 127.
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optimism with which the mechanisms and solutions of the GATS were
seen. Moreover, many institutional and organizational differences exist
between the EU and the MERCOSUR, which hindered MERCOSUR's
adoption of the EU's solutions and instruments. Finally, this is probably
the only path that enables the simultaneous achievement of progress in
the integration of services, while implementing it with the care and within
the timeframes imposed by the restrictions on access in force and political
difficulties. Another element adding to the complexity of the mechanism
under study lies in the fact that the liberalization, resulting from the prep-
aration of banking service lists with a high degree of disaggregation,
makes the opening and the negotiation of offers and commitments in-
cluded therein very fragmented and complex. It is very difficult to com-
pare offers by analyzing their equivalents. 64
On the other hand, a different and necessary approach to the study of
the process toward financial integration may be obtained by comparing
the existing regulatory restrictions in the national schemes to the commit-
ments and offers in each country within the framework of the Monte-
video Protocol, at the different negotiation rounds conducted by the
Services Group. Since the signing of the Montevideo Protocol, the ap-
proach to the negotiation for the opening of services was the definition of
the areas of service, where each country individually prepared its own list
of offers and commitments at a later stage. Moreover, this led each coun-
try to propose offers and commitments at the MERCOSUR analogous to
those each had previously presented to the WTO. This situation remains
unchanged today. Unfortunately, there are areas where liberalization
would be possible with no regulatory obstacles to prevent it, but the
countries neither offer nor promise a greater opening within the frame-
work of the Montevideo Protocol and the Annex to Financial Services.
One illustration of this is in the area of trans-boundary supply and foreign
consumption of banking and insurance services, where none of the coun-
tries has consolidated its offer.65
Another related issue is the need to deepen and systematize the coordi-
nation between the MERCOSUR bodies in charge of the harmonization
process (Sub Group IV) and the liberalization negotiations (Services
Group). Better coordination between the two would give the Services
Group necessary tools, such as up-to-date information, to put adequate
pressure on the representatives of the Member countries to improve their
offers and strengthen their commitments during liberalization
negotiations.
In light of the points raised and the evolution of bank integration over
the years, it is advisable to rethink whether this strategy is truly the best
one to implement the aforementioned integration process. One sugges-
tion is to invert the concept of the lists of offers and commitments and




zation, with the exceptions stated by each country in the list correspond-
ing to the nature of the service involved.
III. PRUDENTIAL REQUISITES IN LIBERALIZATION
AND GREATER COMPETITION
In terms of prudential rules, the MERCOSUR countries have made
and are currently making efforts to harmonize and approach solutions.
In addition, that coordination has been aimed at increasing the require-
ments by adapting to, and in some cases exceeding, international recom-
mendations. The policy adopted at the MERCOSUR level to strengthen
prudential rules in each Member Country does not mean all difficulties
and asymmetries have been resolved. For example, all MERCOSUR
countries maintain minimal net worth requisites during the operation of
the financial institutions, whose amounts are calculated following the rec-
ommendations of the Basel Committee (relation between the capital or
computable net worth items and risk-weighted assets). However, the
content of such demand is diverse, and its comparative analysis is diffi-
cult. Also, when comparing the application of the Basle Committee's rec-
ommendations in the four countries, even when all the countries apply
the recommendations, capital composition is unequal and asset weighting
varies from country to country.66 Thus, Argentina requires a minimal
proportion, whose range depends on the goods under consideration, of 8
percent capital in terms of the assets weighted by risk. Brazil, Uruguay,
and Paraguay require 10 percent, though the latter's Central Bank (the
BCU) is entitled to increase that minimal proportion up to 12 percent.
Furthermore, the differentiation between basic and supplementary capi-
tal (Tier 1 and 2 of the Basle Committee) is not present in the
Paraguayan standards. 67 In the remaining MERCOSUR countries, the
items admitted in one or the other, and their consideration, maintain cer-
tain differences, such as when computing inflation and revaluating goods
in the admission and treatment of subordinate debt.68 Differences are
also noticeable in the way each country weighs its assets against risk when
applying their requirements of capital. 69 This leads to the question of
whether some of the remaining asymmetries become significant when
strengthening national financial systems and their integration potential.
66. Law No. 21.526 of Feb. 14, 1977 (Arg.); Communication "A" No. 2470 of Sept. 27,
1996, No. 2753 of Aug. 18, 1998, No. 2754 of Aug. 18, 1998, No. 2774 of Sept. 15,
1998, No. 2970 of Aug. 11, 1999, No. 3007 of Oct. 20, 1999, No. 3022 of Oct. 7,
1999, No. 3959 of May 30, 2003 (Arg.); Communication "B" No. 4489 of Jan. 25,
1991 (Arg.); Decree No. 4.595 of Dec. 31, 1964 (Braz.); Res. No. 2099 of Aug. 17,
1994, No. 2.122 of June 4, 1984, No. 2.212 of Nov. 20, 1995, No. 2.309 of Aug. 28,
1996, No. 2.606 of May 27, 1999, No. 2.607 of May 27, 1999 (Braz.); Law No.861/96
of July 12, 1996 (Para.); Law No. 15.322 of Sept. 17, 1982, No. 16.327 of Nov. 11,
1992 (Uru.); Decree No. 614/92 of Dec. 11, 1992 (Uru.); Circular Nos. 1613, 1721,
& 1847 (Uru.).
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Beyond some difficulties when interpreting or comparing the require-
ments in each country, it is essential that they all regulate and implement
the Basle recommendations in full, in relation to the composition of capi-
tal and its amount, by weighing it in terms of the different risks the insti-
tution may face.
In a liberalization and deregulation context, which is characteristic of
integration, it is inevitable to preserve and strengthen the soundness of
banking systems for the sake of financial stability. No models exist that
may be transplanted in terms of prudential regulations. Similarly, control
must respond to the new and more deregulated framework, which re-
quires training and experience and implies a certain amount of applica-
tion time.
The special importance of domestic financial systems, which is intensi-
fied in a potential integration context, lies in its close impact on the
macroeconomic variables and in the ease with which the difficulties of
this sector can be transmitted to other countries of the region and in the
world through payment systems and inter-banking credits and deposits.
Thus, it is necessary to balance the opening of the banking sector with the
preservation of its soundness, but there are no recipes to accomplish this.
There are institutional factors, aspects related to pre-existing regulations,
and even elements relative to the circumstantial situation of the banking
sectors that have a direct influence on the rhythm and degree of liberali-
zation, and therefore, on the subsequent cautionary adjustments.
Whereas deregulation can generate a certain idleness in the banking
sector, this can be a transitory factor of financial fragility. The new con-
text for greater openness that enables new types of business and opportu-
nities to financial stakeholders simultaneously requires new rules that are
clear and intense, which shifts the objective of the standards to the new
reality of the sector and the mobility of operators. It is necessary to give
support to the development of a banking sector that is adequately capital-
ized, has good liquidity and management, and can correctly balance risk
and profitability. This, in turn, also implies fluid and transparent infor-
mation, correct regulation, and prudential control. Thus, training and ad-
justments in control and regulations that help keep pace with economic
agents are required. It also implies more emphasis, for example, on inter-
nal banking management systems, risk management, internal control,
stronger implementation of international standards in terms of account-
ing, and auditing. It is important to develop sound commercial practices
and simultaneously facilitate the differentiation between debtors before
international credit markets, which will look closely at all improvements
and modifications that may be introduced in these emerging countries.
All of this should be done without drowning the benefits sought by liber-
alizing the banking sector, which may easily happen if the opening is ei-
ther very sudden or excessive.
MERCOSUR
IV. MERCOSUR STRATEGIES FOR FUTURE NEGOTIATIONS
WITH THIRD PARTIES ON FINANCIAL AREAS
A. LOCATION
In the scope of negotiations related to trade liberalization agreements,
MERCOSUR, as a political factor, could become very relevant if it estab-
lished strategies oriented toward strengthening and developing its activity
sectors. Negotiations or agreements regarding the opening up of the
economies or the financial sectors of the MERCOSUR countries should
be actually implemented only after the macroeconomic and institutional
situation of all its member countries returns to normal. In relation to
future negotiations and/or agreements, focus will be on the use of
MERCOSUR's political capacity in the stable growth of banking institu-
tions and activities throughout the region. At the same time, the joint
negotiation policy of such negotiations, with developed countries as coun-
terparts, will benefit the implementation of the MERCOSUR integration
process. Negotiations with developed countries will obligate
MERCOSUR to preserve consistent parameters that adjust to the poli-
cies and macroeconomic coordination, and require consistency in setting
tariffs as an essential requisite to advance them successfully.
In this regard, and as a means to approach a feasible strategy, bear in
mind that the trend of international organizations, vis-A-vis the liberaliza-
tion of financial markets and the simultaneous strengthening of pruden-
tial standards, will maintain its influence in the whole of Latin America
and within this hemisphere in the MERCOSUR countries. 70 Recall that
even when reforms introduced in the MERCOSUR countries in the
1990s expanded the activities permitted to the banking institutions and
made pre-existing restrictions for foreign investment in the sector more
flexible, there were still significant margins for a possible liberalization. 71
Stricter prudential rules and standards must necessarily be implemented
to accompany the liberalization process, as was the case in the 1990s.
On the other hand, in order to prepare a strategy to negotiate new
trade agreements, especially those relative to accessing markets to supply
financial services, some elements relative to the banking sector should be
noted:
" In order to compete successfully in global financial markets (elec-
tronic banking and merged capital markets), considerable invest-
ment must be made in technological development.
" Competition in the globalized financial sector implies that smaller
institutions will be unable to survive due to their more limited
range of services and proportionally higher fixed costs as com-
pared to larger enterprises. Customers, even investors and con-
sumers, will be attracted to lower prices in services rendered and
easier access (via home computer or at the supermarket) to any
70. See supra Part IID.
71. Id. at Part II.E.
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financial service they want, which will be offered mostly by the
largest institutions.
" Some local Latin American financial institutions, mainly Chilean
and Brazilian, have started to develop strategies and make invest-
ments to position themselves in this new context.72 They are in-
corporating cutting-edge technology, undergoing reengineering,
and acquiring smaller financial institutions both in their countries
of origin, as well as in third party countries. 73 Their core assets are
the know-how they develop, based on the best technology and
management models that enable them to globally offer a wide
range of financial services in any market.
" The MERCOSUR countries, with the exception of Brazil, have
made their schemes more flexible to admit foreign investment uni-
laterally in the banking sector, which has not granted them returns
in terms of accessing other markets.74 In addition, this could imply
a special difficulty to local financial clusters that might require the
support of joint governmental policies to overcome the barriers
that block their access to other countries when trying to render
financial services. A similar analysis may be conducted in terms of
the possibility of encouraging and strengthening regional financial
clusters. The latter, on the other hand, may become a useful tool
to mitigate the trend of financial concentration in the largest mul-
tinationals that have recently generated uncertainty as to the
soundness of their policies when countries and regions where they
are established get into critical situations.
B. CONTEXT AND STRATEGIES
In order to neutralize or mitigate the trend to direct liberalization
spurred by international organizations and by the majority of countries in
the developed world, 75 MERCOSUR should focus its external negotia-
tions by granting the financial institutions of its Member States at least
gradual concessions to allow them access to provide financial services in
foreign markets. These aspects are essential for MERCOSUR Party
States to obtain greater benefits in such negotiations, and the latter do
not result in mere openings of economies to the trade flows coming from
third-world countries. This bears special significance in light of the po-
tential growth of the banking sector in the MERCOSUR countries. The
direction that negotiations take in the international arena may define
how and who will be able to develop this potential for expansion.
GATS and the Basle Committee are factors of great influence on the
banking regulations of MERCOSUR countries and on Latin America in
72. Holz Latin American, supra note 54, at 24-26.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. See supra Part II.D.
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general. 76 The first emphasizes liberalization, and the second emphasizes
the strengthening of prudential standards in the banking sector. Re-
cently, recommendations of the World Bank (WB), the IMF, and the
IADB have been contributing to both trends-greater opening and in-
creased prudential requirements in the financial activity.
The four MERCOSUR countries have signed the GATS, which pro-
motes competition in the financial sectors by avoiding anti-competitive
practices in those institutions, and a greater efficiency in the allocation of
resources and services of the financial industry. These concepts are being
implemented in different ways by each country: first, Argentina in great
depth, and recently, Brazil has privatized several federal banks.77 In ad-
dition, they have dismantled pre-existing monopolies in the banking sec-
tor. This has been done without designing or foreseeing a common
strategy in the framework of the WTO, which should be corrected. Fur-
thermore, the United States and other countries, such as the United
Kingdom and Germany, have been negotiating directly with some of the
countries-mainly Brazil and Argentina-to open financial markets. 78 In
the context of these bilateral negotiations, it is easy for any of the devel-
oped countries to preclude the access of MERCOSUR entities into their
own market, such as by stating the exception to prudential standards ac-
cepted by GATS. This circumstance would hardly take place during a
joint negotiation by the block due to the greater power of the group.
In terms of fundamental aspects, the MERCOSUR countries benefited
from the adjustments they introduced to their financial systems between
1980 and the late 1990s. Privatization, mergers, readjustments, and bank-
ing modernization produced positive effects. 79 On the other hand, the
lack of common strategies at the level of MERCOSUR, vis-A-vis an open-
ing in foreign investment in the banking sector, may have a negative in-
fluence in the development of local financial institutions. These
institutions may require consistent governmental policies to overcome
the barriers that prevent foreign institutions from operating in some
countries. It would be recommendable to help local institutions face the
growing trend towards concentration around international financial con-
glomerates. It is true that these conglomerates contribute investment,
business expertise, technology, and innovation. However, excessive con-
centration may lead-in the case of a crisis of any of these international
institutions-to dramatic consequences at the global level, especially in
countries where their presence is more prevalent. It may also contribute
to more volatility in capital flows, consequently causing restrictions in do-
mestic credit, insofar as multinational financial institutions move their re-
sources from one region to another quickly, following decisions of their
headquarters in response to changing circumstances and better business
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Holz Latin American, supra note 54, at 26.
79. Id.
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opportunities. Accordingly, the new Basle capital rules, which come into
force in a couple of years, will likely bring about a reduction of invest-
ment on the part of international banks or financial conglomerates in the
region. Therefore, the generation of strategies to strengthen and develop
negotiation opportunities for regional entities (including clusters) may re-
present an efficient way to preserve competition in the local markets.
Furthermore, this helps avoid or at least mitigate an excessive concentra-
tion in financial oligopolies, and simultaneously diminish the risks of a
potentially greater volatility of capital flows or of a potential crisis at the





1. INTERNATIONAL REGULATION Area de Libre Comercio de las
Americas (Free Trade Area of the Americas) (ALCA), or Free Trade
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America's Meeting, Miami Principles Declaration, Dec. 1994.
ALCA Ministerial Meetings Joint Declarations:
First Trade Ministerial Meeting, Denver, United States, June 30, 1995,
Joint Declaration.
Second Trade Ministerial Meeting, Cartagena, Colombia, Mar. 21,
1996, Joint Declaration.
Third Trade Ministerial Meeting, Belo Horizonte, Brazil, May 16,
1997, Joint Declaration.
Fourth Trade Ministerial Meeting, San Jos6, Costa Rica, Mar. 19,
1998, Joint Declaration.
Fifth Trade Ministerial Meeting, Toronto, Canada, Nov. 4, 1998, Joint
Declaration.
Sixth Trade Ministerial Meeting, Buenos Aires, Argentina, Apr. 7,
2001, Joint Declaration.
ALCA Agreement Draft, Apr. 2001.
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For MERCOSUR regulations, decisions, etc., see http://www.
mercosur.org.uy/paginalesp.htm.
a. Decisions of CMC:
CMC Decision 8/93 (Jan. 17, 1994) (Capital Markets minimum
regulation).
CMC Decision 10/93 (Jan. 17, 1994) (Adoption of the Basle Rules).
CMC Decision 13/97 (Dec. 15, 1997) (Montevideo Protocol concern-
ing MERCOSUR Commerce Services).
CMC Decision 9/98 (July 23-24, 1998) (Montevideo Protocol con-
cerning MERCOSUR Commerce Services and the specific sectorial
rules attachments and initial commitments lists).
CMC Decision 12/98 (July 23-24, 1998) (Montevideo Protocol con-
cerning MERCOSUR Commerce Services).
CMC Decision 1/00 (June 30, 2000) (First round negotiation for spe-
cific commitments in services).
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CMC Decision 3/00 (June 30, 2000) (MERCOSUR origin regulation).
CMC Decision 6/00 (June 30, 2000) (General plan of reciprocal coop-
eration and coordination for regional safety regarding child traffic).
CMC Decision 8/00 (June 30, 2000) (General plan of reciprocal coop-
eration and coordination for regional safety regarding financial and
economic crimes among MERCOSUR states).
CMC Decision 14/00 (June 30, 2000) (Neighboring Traffic Regulation
among MERCOSUR states).
CMC Decision 18/00 (June 30, 2000) (Definition and configuration of
safety information exchange system among MERCOSUR states).
CMC Decision 22/00 (June 30, 2000) (Market access).
CMC Decision 24/00 (June 30, 2000) (MERCOSUR Administrative
Secretary).
CMC Decision 25/00 (June 30, 2000) (Improvement of Brazil's dis-
pute settlement system protocol).
CMC Decision 26/00 (June 30, 2000) (Analysis of the Common Mar-
ket Group and Commerce Commission subordinated bodies).
CMC Decision 27/00 (June 30, 2000) (External Common Tariff).
CMC Decision 28/00 (June 30, 2000) (Commercial and competition
defenses).
CMC Decision 29/00 (June 30, 2000) (Defense rules against subsidies
granted by non-MERCOSUR countries).
CMC Decision 30/00 (June 30, 2000) (Macroeconomic coordination).
CMC Decision 31/00 (June 30, 2000) (Inversions, production, and ex-
portation incentives, including the Free Trade Zone, Temporary Ad-
mission, and other special systems).
CMC Decision 32/00 (June 30, 2000) (External relationship).
CMC Decision 36/00 (June 30, 2000) (South Africa Negotiations).
CMC Decision 37/00 (June 30, 2000) (Mexican Negotiations).
CMC Decision 40/00 (Dec. 14-15, 2000) (Cooperation agreement be-
tween MERCOSUR Centrals Banks for prevention and repression of
money laundering operations).
CMC Decision 51/00 (Dec. 14-15, 2000) (Global Preferences System).
CMC Decision 53/00 (Dec. 14-15, 2000) (Administrative Cooperation
Agreement-MERCOSUR Asociaci6n Latino Americana de Integra-
ci6n (ALADI) General Secretary).
MERCOSUR
CMC Decision 56/00 (Dec. 14-15, 2000) (Second Round Negotiation
for specific commitments in services).
CMC Decision 57/00 (Dec. 14-15, 2000) (Market access).
CMC Decision 64/00 (Dec. 14-15, 2000) (Commerce and competition
defenses).
CMC Decision 65/00 (Dec. 14-15, 2000) (Improvement of dispute set-
tlement system).
CMC Decision 67/00 (Dec. 14-15, 2000) (External Common Tariff).
CMC Decision 69/00 (Dec. 14-15, 2000) (Special importation customs
rules).
CMC Decision 70/00 (Dec. 14-15, 2000) (MERCOSUR automotive
policy).
CMC Decision 03/01 (June 22, 2001) (MERCOSUR action program
against illicit activities in international commerce).
CMC Decision 04/01 (June 22, 2001) (MERCOSUR automotive
policy).
CMC Decision 05/01 (June 22, 2001) (High level group for the exami-
nation of consistency and dispersion of the External Common Tariff).
CMC Decision 07/01 (June 22, 2001) (Timetable adjustment for the
MERCOSUR relaunching program).
CMC Decision 08/01 (June 22, 2001) (MERCOSUR and third coun-
tries negotiations).
b. Common Market Group (GMC) Resolutions:
GMC Res. 62/97 (Dec. 13, 1997) (General conditions of civil respon-
sibility in transportation insurance).
GMC Res. 63/99 (Sept. 27-29, 1999) (Compulsory civil responsibility
insurance for some international trips-damages caused to objects or
persons not transported).
GMC Res. 3/00 (Apr. 4-5, 2000) (Modification of MERCOSUR
common nomenclature and its corresponding AEC).
GMC Res. 36/00 (June 26-28, 2000) (Deepening of specific commit-
ments in services).
GMC Res. 43/00 (June 26-28, 2000) (Ad hoc group for electronic
commerce, Group Ad Hoc).
GMC Res. 44/00 (June 26-28, 2000) (Ad hoc group for public works
or services concessions creation).
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GMC Res. 76/00 (Dec. 5-7, 2000) (Deepening liberalization commit-
ments in services-"III Round Negotiation for specific commitments
in services").
GMC Res. 01/01 (Mar. 28-29, 2001) (Decision Project "Exceptional
Rules in Tariffs").
GMC Res. 25/01 (June 12-13, 2001) (Modification of the Common
External Tariff).
c. Acts of the Working Subgroup 4 of the GMC:
MERCOSUR/Act No. 1/95 (First Meeting of Oct. 1995).
MERCOSUR/Act No. 2/96 (Second Meeting of Apr. 8-10, 1996).
MERCOSUR/Special Meeting Act (Aug. 7-9 1996) (Chart of
account).
MERCOSUR/Brazil report on Financial Affairs Negotiations evolu-
tion (Oct. 1996).
MERCOSUR/Third Act Meeting (Nov. 6-8, 1996).
MERCOSUR/Fourth Act Meeting (Aug. 28-29, 1997).
MERCOSUR/Fifth Act Meeting (Nov. 17-18, 1997).
MERCOSUR/Sixth Act Meeting (May 4-6, 1998).
MERCOSUR/Seventh Act Paraguay Meeting (May 17-18, 1999).
MERCOSUR/Eighth Act Montevideo Meeting (Oct. 20-21, 1999).
MERCOSUR/Ninth Act Montevideo Meeting (Oct. 20-22, 1999).
MERCOSUR/Tenth Act Argentina Meeting (Apr. 26-28, 2000).
MERCOSUR/Eleventh Act Recife Meeting (Oct. 25-27, 2000).
MERCOSUR/Twelfth Act Paraguay Meeting (May 9-11, 2001).
Common Market Group Acts:
GMC Act 01/01 (Mar. 28-29, 2001) (Extraordinary Meeting in
Asunci6n).
Common Market Council Act:
CMC Act 01/01 (Apr. 7, 2001) (Second Extraordinary Meeting in
Buenos Aires).
OMC (WTO)
Annex 1B: General Agreement in Services.
Financial Services Decision.
MERCOSUR
Sectorial Specific Commitment List.
Legal Text: WTO Agreement.
Uruguayan Round Final Act Full Text.




Law No. 21.526 of Feb. 14, 1977 (Financial Entities-Banks-Non-
Banking Financial Entities-Credits) (modified by Law No. 22.871 of
Aug. 8, 1983;
Law No. 23.267 of Sept. 1, 1989; Law No. 22.144 of Sept. 23, 1992;
Decree No. 1860 of Oct. 13, 1992; Decree No. 1887 of Oct. 15, 1992;
Decree No. 146/94 of Feb. 21, 1994; Decree No. 290 of Feb. 27, 1995;
Law No. 24.485 of Apr. 5, 1995; Law No. 24.627 of Feb. 11, 1996).
b. Capital markets:
Law No. 17.811 of July 22, 1968 (modified by Law No. 24.241 of Oct.
13, 1993).
c. Banco Central de la Reptiblica Argentina (BCRA) (Argentinean
Central Bank) Regulations, available at http://www.bcra.gov.ar/hm
000000_i.asp:
Communication "A" No. 2729 of July 6, 1998, available at http://
www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/comytexord/A2729.pdf.
Communication "A" No. 2840 of Jan. 13, 1999, available at http://
www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/comytexord/A2840.pdf.
Communication "A" No. 2893 of Mar. 31, 1999, available at http://
www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/comytexord/A2893.pdf.
Communication "A" No. 2935 of June 25, 1999, available at http://
www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/comytexord/A2935.pdf.
Communication "A" No. 2936 of June 25,1999, available at http://
www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/comytexord/A2936.pdf.
Communication "A" No. 2937 of June 25, 1999, available at http://
www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/comytexord/A2937.pdf.
Communication "A" No. 2950 of July 16,1999, available at http://
www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/comytexord/A2950.pdf.
2004]
326 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 10
Communication "A" No. 2970 of Aug. 11, 1999, available at http://
www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/comytexord/A2970.pdf.
Communication "A" No. 3028 of Dec. 2, 1999, available at http://
www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/comytexord/A3028.pdf.
Communication "A" No. 3128 of June 30, 2000, available at http://
www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/comytexord/A3128.pdf.
Communication "A" No. 3278 of June 1, 2001, available at http://
www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/comytexord/A3278.pdf.
Communication "A" No. 3307 of July 31, 2001, available at http://
www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/comytexord/A3307.pdf.
Communication "A" No. 3314 of Aug. 6,2001, available at http://
www.bcra.gov.ar/pdfs/comytexord/A3314.pdf.
d. Insurance:
Insurance Law No. 17.418 of July 1, 1968.
Insurance and Reinsurance Activity Law No. 20.091 of July 1, 1973
(modified by Law No. 24.241 of Oct. 19, 1993).
Regulation of Insurance Advisor Producer Activity Law No. 22.400
of Aug. 17, 1981.
Res. No. 25.565 of Apr. 1, 1998.
BRAZIL
a. Banking regulation:
Law No. 4.595 of Dec. 31, 1964.
Law No. 4.728 of July 14, 1965 (regulating the access of foreign insti-
tutions to national financial system).
Res. No. 1.524 of Aug. 17, 1994.
Res. No. 2.099 of Aug. 17, 1994.
Res. No. 2.193 of Aug. 31, 1995.
Res. No. 2.197 of Aug. 30, 1995.
Res. No. 2.211 of Nov. 20, 1995.
Res. No. 2.212 of Nov. 20, 1995.
Res. No. 2.267 of Mar. 29, 1996.
Res. No. 2.474 of Mar. 27, 1998.
Res. No. 2.543 of Aug. 26, 1998.
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Res. No. 2.606 of May 27, 1999.
Res. No. 2.607 of May 27, 1999.
Res. No. 2.682 of Dec. 22, 1999.
Res. No. 2.692 of Mar. 1, 2000.
Res. No. 2.724 of June 1, 2000.
Res. No. 2.977 of Apr. 6, 2000.
b. Capital Markets:
Law No. 6.385 of Dec. 7, 1976 (regulating Capital Markets and the
Securities Commission).
Law No. 6.404 of 1976 (regulating corporations).
Law No. 9.457 of May 5, 1997 (modifying Law Nos. 6.385 and 6.404).
Res. No. 1.656, Oct. 26, 1989.
c. Insurance:
Decree No. 73 of Nov. 21, 1966.
CHILE
a. Banking regulation:
Law No. 19.528 of Nov. 4, 1997.
b. Capital markets:
Law No. 18.045 of Oct. 22, 1981. This law was last modified by Law




Decree No. 18 of Mar. 25, 1952 (creating the Central Bank of
Paraguay).
Law No. 861/96 of July 12, 1996.
b. Capital markets:
Law No. 1284/98 of Aug. 4, 1999.
c. Insurance:
Insurance and Reinsurance Law No. 827 of Feb. 12, 1996.
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URUGUAY
a. Banking regulation:
Decree No. 614/92 of Dec. 11, 1992, reglamentary of Law No. 16.327.
BCU Statute Law No. 16.696 of Mar. 30, 1995.
Law No. 15.322 of Sept. 17, 1982 (regulating the Financial Intermedi-
ation System).
Law No. 16.327 of Nov. 11, 1992 (reforming Law No. 15.322).
b. Capital markets:
Decree No. 344/96 of Aug. 28, 1996.
Law No. 16.749 of May 30, 1996.
Law No. 16.774 of Sept. 27, 1996
Law No. 17.202 of Sept. 24, 1999.
c. Insurance:
Decree No. 354/94 of Aug. 17, 1994.
Financial Intermediation Laws Nos. 15.322 of Sept. 17, 1982 and
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